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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-10305
D.C. Docket No. 1:08-cv-02138-JOF
JOHN WETHERBEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE SOUTHERN COMPANY,
Defendant,
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia
(June 11, 2014)
Before WILSON, Circuit Judge, and BUCKLEW* and LAZZARA,** District 
Judges.
Honorable Susan C. Bucklew, United States District Judge for the Middle District of 
Florida, sitting by designation.
"Honorable Richard A. Lazzara, United States District Judge for the Middle District of 
Florida, sitting by designation.
AUTHENTICATED , 
U.S. GOVERNMENT^ 
INFORMATION -
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WILSON, Circuit Judge:
John Wetherbee appeals the district court’s grant of Southern Nuclear 
Operating Company’s (Southern Nuclear) motion for summary judgment as to his 
claim of discrimination based on the misuse of information obtained during a 
required medical evaluation, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(C). We previously affirmed in part the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to Southern Nuclear as to Wetherbee’s 
disability discrimination claim under § 12112(a) of the ADA, but remanded the 
case in part to allow the district court to enter an order addressing Wetherbee’s 
claim under § 12112(d)(3)(C). Wetherbee v. Southern Co., 423 F. App’x 933, 934 
(11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). After review of the parties’ briefs, the record on 
appeal, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
Wetherbee applied for a systems engineer position with Southern Nuclear at 
one of its nuclear power plants. Southern Nuclear extended Wetherbee a job offer 
contingent on satisfactory completion of a medical evaluation. During 
Wetherbee’s evaluation, he informed Southern Nuclear that he suffered from 
bipolar disorder. His medical records indicated that he took medication to manage 
the disorder, had not experienced any bipolar episodes in six or seven years, and 
his previous bipolar episodes had only occurred when doctors attempted to take 
him off of his medication. However, Wetherbee had recently attempted to alter his
2
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medication regimen and, in spite of his healthcare provider’s recommendation, was 
not being treated by a psychiatrist. Southern Nuclear’s medical team determined 
that Wetherbee could only be hired if several conditions were met, including 
compliance with his medication regimen and a restriction from working on “safety- 
sensitive systems and equipment” for one year while Southern Nuclear verified his 
compliance with his medication regimen. Because the systems engineer position 
required that Wetherbee work on safety-sensitive systems and equipment, Southern 
Nuclear determined that it could not hire Wetherbee and rescinded his conditional 
job offer.
On remand, the district court found that the restriction which led Southern 
Nuclear to rescind Wetherbee’s job offer was job-related and consistent with 
business necessity and that, based on this restriction, Wetherbee could not perform 
the job with reasonable accommodations. Accordingly, the district court held that 
Southern Nuclear was entitled to the ADA’s business necessity affirmative 
defense, see Allmondv. Akal Sec. Inc., 558 F.3d 1312, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(per curiam), and granted summary judgment in its favor. On appeal, Wetherbee 
argues, among other things, that the district court erred in finding that the business 
necessity affirmative defense applied because the relevant restriction was not 
consistent with business necessity and there were other reasonable 
accommodations that could have allowed Wetherbee to perform the job of a
3
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systems engineer. The only issue we need to address in this appeal, however, is 
whether a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(C) requires a plaintiff to 
prove he is disabled. This court has not addressed whether § 12112(d)(3)(C) 
requires such a showing.
Southern Nuclear asks us to follow the Seventh and Tenth Circuits and hold 
that under § 12112(d)(3)(C), Wetherbee must prove that he is disabled in order to 
show that the restrictions imposed upon him violated the ADA. See O ’Neal v. City 
o f New Albany, 293 F.3d 998, 1010 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002) (“If the applicant is not 
disabled, . . . then the applicant cannot recover under § 12112(d)(3)(C).”);
Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oil Field Operations, Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 960 n.4 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (“[T]o recover under subsection 12112(d)(3)(C) a plaintiff must show 
the employer used collected medical information to discriminate on the basis of a 
disability.”). Southern Nuclear also points us to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14, which 
applies directly to § 12112(d)(3)(C) and states, “if certain criteria are used to 
screen out an employee or employees with disabilities . . . the exclusionary criteria 
must be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” (Emphasis added.) 
Accordingly, Southern Nuclear argues that in the absence of a disability, there is 
no discrimination, and Wetherbee’s § 12112(d)(3)(C) claim fails.
Wetherbee asks us to hold the exact opposite. Wetherbee says we should 
hold that § 12112(d)(3)(C) does not require him to prove that he was disabled in
4
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order to show that Southern Nuclear violated the ADA. He notes that we have 
already held that disability status is not an element of §§ 12112(d)(2) and (d)(4)(A) 
claims. See Harrison v. BenchmarkElecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1213 
(11th Cir. 2010); Owusu-Ansah v. Coco-Cola Co., 715 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 655 (2013). Accordingly, Wetherbee argues that we 
should extend the holdings of those cases and hold that disability status is not an 
element of § 12112(d)(3)(C).
We disagree and instead join the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in holding that 
an individual seeking relief under § 12112(d)(3)(C) must demonstrate that he is a 
qualified individual with a disability. Contrary to Wetherbee’s argument, our 
holdings in Harrison and Owusu-Ansah—that disability status is not an element of 
§§ 12112(d)(2) and (d)(4)(A) claims—should not be extended to § 12112(d)(3)(C) 
claims. Section 12112(d)(2) prohibits employers from conducting “a medical 
examination or mak[ing] inquiries of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is 
an individual with a disability.” (Emphasis added). Section 12112(d)(4) offers 
current employees the same protection. By the plain language of these provisions, 
a violation occurs when any applicant or employee is subject to an exam.1 
Accordingly, it simply would not make sense to require, as an element of those 
claims, a showing that an individual is disabled, because these subsections protect
1 Likewise, under § 12112(d)(3)(B), an offeree may have a claim if his information is not 
kept confidential. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
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all applicants and all employees at certain stages from being subject to a test to 
determine whether or not they are disabled in the first place. See §§ 12112(d)(2) 
and (d)(4)(A).
A violation under § 12112(d)(3)(C), on the other hand, occurs when 
information is used in violation of some other provision of the ADA. Specifically, 
§ 12112(d)(3)(C) permits medical exams as a condition of employment, so long as 
“the results of such examinations] are used in accordance with this subchapter” 
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d)(3)(C) (emphasis added). It differs from the sections 
discussed above because there, the violations are completed when a test is simply 
administered or confidentiality is violated.
To be successful under § 12112(d)(3)(C), however, Wetherbee needs to 
show not just that the information was gathered but that the information was not 
“used in accordance with this subchapter.” Id. Wetherbee never suggests which 
provision of the ADA was violated by Southern Nuclear’s use of the results of his 
exam, other than § 12112(a), which prohibits discrimination “on the basis of 
disability.” Thus, whether or not the results of an exam under (d)(3)(C) were used 
in accordance with the applicable subchapter turns on whether there was 
discrimination on the basis of disability, and discrimination on the basis of 
disability cannot occur unless the claimant is disabled. Therefore, Wetherbee 
could not prevail under § 12112(d)(3)(C) without showing that he is a disabled
6
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individual.
Wetherbee, however, admitted at oral argument that he cannot demonstrate 
that he is an individual with a disability. While the district court did not 
specifically address this statutory interpretation issue, “we may affirm its judgment 
on any ground that finds support in the record.” Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 
F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, 
the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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